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I. Introduction
"Why were some more inclined than others to release their gold fetters?" (Eichengreen 1992, p. 23 ). This paper takes up Eichengreen's question with respect to the European continent. Every European country, which was involved in some form of a currency crisis in the wake of the Great Depression, developed its own historiography and traditions, focussing most often on the crucial time-frame immediately before the exit took place. However, there exists surprisingly little comparative work on the currency crises of the interwar years. In particular, there are few studies that link up with the recent theoretical literature on currency crises and none that makes an effort to test those theories systematically against the data. In this paper I propose discrete time survival models based on monthly observations as a simple framework to bridge the gap between country-specific narratives, existing comparative studies, and recent theoretical approaches to currency crises.
In his fundamental work of the interwar gold-exchange standard, Eichengreen (1992) argued that it was the failure to coordinate monetary policies that prevented countries to adjust to a first wave of deflationary shocks in the late 1920s. Here, the currency crises of the early 1930s are essentially rooted in the existence of a monetary policy tri-lemma, where the fixed exchange rates under the gold standard came under simultaneous pressure from capital flight and domestic calls for expansionary monetary policies. Tightening monetary conditions in the US spilled over into capital importing countries in their attempt to prevent capital outflows without imposing capital controls. The implied deflation placed these countries between Scylla and Charybdis, as real wages and real interest rates increased to unseen levels: in an attempt to rescue the currency and access to foreign capital, they wrecked their economies. According to Simmons (1994) World War One undermined the political tolerance for domestic adjustment: a defence of the gold standard against pressure from international capital markets via tightening monetary policy was less feasible after 1918. She uses binary choice models to show that variations in the pattern of exit from the interwar gold-exchange standard can be explained partly by variations in domestic political and institutional conditions. James (2001) extends the basic narrative to include the collapse of world trade and restrictions on international labour mobility. James also puts notably more emphasis on banking crises and points out that, at least in some cases, country-specific structural weaknesses in the financial sector conditioned and deepened the currency crisis. Besides many country studies, there have been recently two further attempts for a comparative cross-country analysis of the collapse of the interwar gold-exchange standard, namely H. Wolf and Yousef (2005) , and Wandschneider (2005) . They both attempt to generalise the experience of a large set of countries in a comparative framework and use duration analysis to test for the empirical relevance of several hypotheses. While this is a promising approach, the theoretical background of the tested hypotheses remains somewhat unclear.
Moreover, both studies limit attention to annual data only and focus on a quite narrow class of duration models. Is it possible to explain this curious pattern systematically, in a coherent theoretical framework? The modern literature on currency crises might provide useful insights for the interwar period. It has become standard to distinguish between first-, second, and third-generation models of currency crises, which are not mutually exclusive. Briefly, in first generation models in the spirit of Krugman (1979) countries face currency crises when a currency peg becomes unsustainable due to some developments in fundamental macroeconomic variables, which cause large capital outflows. This is clearly related to Eichengreen (1992) , who argued that for European capital importers a key factor was tightening monetary policy in the main capital exporting country that changed macroeconomic fundamentals in capital importing countries. However, many other "conditioning" factors have been proposed in more country-specific arguments, which can be framed in "first-generation models", such as the return to gold at unsustainable parities (Keynes 1925 , Redmond 1982 , Sicsic 1992 ), changes in the seniority of reparation debt from the Dawes Plan of 1924 onwards (Ritschl 2002 ), or growing current account deficits due to exogenous changes in the structure of world trade (Svennilson 1954) .
Second generation models in the tradition of Obstfeld (1986) , stress the impact of market expectations rather than the role of macroeconomic fundamentals -while obviously the two are tightly interrelated. According to these models, a currency crisis occurs due to either self-fulfilling expectations, herd behaviour based on incomplete information, or contagion. Related to this, Calvo and Reinhart (2001, 2002) have argued that developing countries are reluctant to tolerate much variation in exchange rates due to a "fear of floating" that mainly stems from a lack of credibility and the fear to loose access to capital markets. This corresponds to the argument for Interwar Europe that policymakers were eager to join the gold standard to import credibility Finally, third generation models have evolved along two lines, namely random withdrawal models (Chang and Velasco, 1998) and moral hazard models (McKinnon and Huw, 1996, Krugman, 1998 ). These models highlight that structural problems in the banking and financial sector can affect the probability that currency crises occur in the first place but also the character and length of the currency crisis. Hence, the models allow for the possibility of a simultaneous currency and banking crisis -a "twin crisis", which is obviously related to the discussion about a German "twin crisis" in 1931 (James 1984 , Schnabel 2004 , Temin 2008 . But there is a much more general point to make (Bernanke 1995 , Calvo et al. 2006 : in the presence of rigidities, especially nominal wage-stickiness and non-contingent financial contracts, price deflation would cause significant increases in real wages and in real debt -Irwin Fisher (1933) discussed the latter in the context for the Great Depression as "Debt Deflation". While a rise in real wages would tend to increase unemployment and hence foster political pressure on monetary policy, debt deflation can trigger a wave of bankruptcies in highly indebted sectors. Clearly, together these factors can bring about a "twin crisis".
A straightforward way to test the relevance of these various models is to estimate the probability of exit from the interwar gold-exchange system as a function of cross-sectional and time series variation in a set of explanatory variables. Instead of using more specific "duration models", my empirical strategy is based on an econometric framework that nests various discrete time survival models, which allows to test for different forms of duration dependence and distributions, rather than to assume them.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses in more detail how first-to third-generation models of currency-crises correspond to the various hypotheses from the literature on interwar Europe. Section III motivates my empirical strategy to test the empirical relevance of those hypotheses based on discrete time survival models. It includes a s a brief description of the data and the definition of variables. Section IV presents the main empirical results from my analysis. Based on this background, section V illustrates briefly for the cases of France and Poland how these results can be put back into the context of some country-specific debates.
Section VI concludes.
II. Hypotheses on the Exit Pattern and Models of Currency Crises
Possible explanations for the observed variation in European exit decisions abound. They tend to be rather complex and more often than not have been proposed to explain the experience of specific countries rather than the overall pattern. In this section, I briefly survey the key features of the various "generations" of models of currency crises that dominate the literature. I show how these relate to various hypotheses put forward in the historical literature and thereby, how they can structure our comparative analysis.
First generation models in the spirit of Krugman (1979) generate a currency crisis when an existing currency peg becomes unsustainable due to large capital outflows, which in turn are triggered by some developments in "fundamental" macroeconomic variables. The fundamentals proposed in the recent literature include excessively expansionary monetary policy, large and growing balance of payment deficits, excessive investments in high-risk and low-profit projects, but also deficiencies in regulation. These factors can widen the gap between the proclaimed goals of monetary policy (for example defending a fixed exchange rate) on the one hand side, and the means to keep these promises on the other, and thereby undermine the credibility of monetary authorities. Sometimes, this kind of crisis is referred to as a "fundamental crisis". Second generation models, for example Obstfeld (1986) , build on Krugman (1979) but stress that even if the development of fundamental variables is not particularly unfavourable, a currency crisis can occur due to -for example -selffulfilling expectations, herding behaviour or contagion. Essentially, the government weights the benefits from adherence to a currency peg (such as the possibility to import credibility to fight inflation) to those against the peg (such as the possibility to pursue a monetary policy according to domestic policy objectives) and these weights will change with the arrival of new information. In Obstfeld (1986), a crisis can occur when the loss arising from maintaining the current regime is considered to be at least as large as the combined loss from discretionary policy and the associated loss in credibility. Related to this, Calvo and Reinhart (2001, 2002) have argued that developing countries are reluctant to tolerate much variation in exchange rates due to a "fear of floating" that mainly stems from a lack of credibility and the fear to loose access to capital markets. In models with coherent self-fulfilling expectations, there are multiple steady states in exchange rates and monetary policy. The arrival of "bad news" from official statistics or changes in the political conditions can move the economy from one steady state to another. Herding models in turn are based on the idea that gathering information is costly. When the majority of participants behaves adaptively and follows big participants in their behaviour, small random shocks to the latter can have large effects. Similarly, regional linkages through trade or financial relations can cause crisis contagion, as a crisis in one region will adversely affect the macroeconomic fundamentals -or at least the perception thereof -in the second region (which is not necessarily the geographical neighbour).
Third generation models have evolved along two lines, namely random withdrawal models (Chang and Velasco, 1998) and moral hazard models (McKinnon and Huw, 1996, Krugman, 1998), and we will focus on the latter. These models highlight that structural problems in the banking and financial sector can affect the probability that currency crises occur in the first place but also the character and length of the currency crisis. Hence, the models allow for the possibility of a simultaneous currency and banking crisis -a "twin crisis". For example, in Krugman (1998), the government guarantees investments in companies for banks that are mainly branch offices of foreign banks or whose business strategy relies mainly on borrowing money in international capital markets to extend loans to domestic companies. The incentive for the government to issue guarantees comes from an attempt to attract foreign investment. However, when the government fails to regulate and control financial agents, serious problems of moral hazard can make the country prone to a banking crisis that will turn into a currency crisis as foreign funds are here is that a large deflationary shock alone has the potential to trigger a "twin crisis" under a fixed exchange rate regime due to the twin pressure on domestic monetary policy to counter unemployment and pressure on private banks from increasingly indebted sectors suffering from debt deflation (Fisher 1933) . Moreover, third generation models such a Krugman (1998) are obviously related to the ongoing discussion about a German "twin crisis" in 1931 (James 1984 , Schnabel 2004 , Temin 2008 ). The argument here is (see James 1984 , Schnabel 2004 ) that in the German case a banking crisis preceded and possibly caused the currency crisis of July 1931, rooted in some structural weaknesses in Germany's financial sector similar to the moral hazard problems in Krugman (1998) . This has been questioned by Temin (2008) who agued that it was rather banks reacting to a looming currency crisis than banks causing a currency crisis.
Hence, Temin (2008) argues that the German crisis should be framed as a first generation model of currency crisis. More generally, he refers to Grossmann (1994) as evidence that adherence to the gold standard as such made banks vulnerable during the early 1930s. The evidence in Grossman (1994) is actually not conclusive on this question. It rather indicates that countries helped to stabilise their banking sector by leaving gold early -which is difficult to be squared with Temin (2008) . Nevertheless, it has been argued that for European capital importers in general a key factor was tightening monetary policy in the main capital exporter country, the US (Eichengreen 1992 ). This changed macroeconomic fundamentals in those countries, namely their access to capital and put their exchange rates under pressure. In addition, several factors have been proposed in more country-specific arguments, which can be framed in first-generation models as producing unsustainable developments in macroeconomic variables. One such factor is the return to gold at unsustainable parities (Keynes 1925 , Redmond 1982 , Sicsic 1992 . While Britain returned to gold at the pre-war parity, the French Franc had lost 80% of its pre-war value when the The argument is that now senior reparation debt blocked Germany's access to foreign capital markets, a credit constraint that started to bind exactly at the onset of the Great Depression. Not at least, it has been stated that Europe's competitive position in world markets weakened during and after World War One, and especially European exporters of agricultural produce faced increasing difficulties from the mid-1920s onwards (Lewis 1949) . While challenged by Federico (2005) , the idea that changes in the world trading system left the European economies more vulnerable -or that it "conditioned" the probability of some wider crisis on the continent -still features While the use of monthly data is certainly preferable to annual data, we obviously still have to deal with a discrete time framework. The discrete hazard function λi(t) that gives the instantaneous probability of exit of country i (given survival up to that point) is modelled as follows:
where β denotes the baseline hazard, X ij is a vector of monthly explanatory variables (j=1..k) specific to country i and γ i a vector of variable-specific parameters.
The function g(.) is a link function for which we will assume various specifications.
This modelling of the hazard function results from the equivalence between a large class of discrete time survival models and sequential models (see Fahrmeir and Tutz
2001, Chapter 9).
Here, the baseline hazard β captures the basic idea of duration dependence and could be specified as a constant or as a function of the time already spent on the goldstandard in a linear or nonlinear form. For example, with positive duration dependence, the probability to exit would increase with the time already spent on gold. However, note that most of the hypotheses put forward to explain the pattern of exit from gold concern the "conditioning" various factors X -the factors that condition the baseline hazard, while the idea of duration dependence in the pattern of exit from gold lacks (so far) a straightforward theoretical underpinning. Nevertheless, we will see below how positive duration dependence might be interpreted as capturing some of the hypotheses mentioned in section II. The idea is rather to test explicitly for the impact of various forms of duration dependence on exit probabilities rather than simply to assume some form of duration dependence as done elsewhere. This any case, the focus should be on the "conditioning" factors X, which relate much more closely to the theoretical literature.
I will evaluate two possible specifications of the link function that have received considerable attention in empirical survival analysis: first, a logistic specification, which is equivalent to a proportional odds model (Thompson 1977 ) and second a "log-log" or extreme value specification, which is equivalent to a proportional hazards model in discrete time (Cox 1972, see also Fahrmeir and Tutz 2001). For example, the former has been used in the study by Klein and Marion (1997) on the duration of exchange-rate pegs, while the latter is widespread in studies on the determinants of unemployment spells (Narendranathan and Stewart 1993), but has also been recently applied to the analysis of exchange rate regimes (Waelti 2005) or the duration of trade relations (Besedes and Prusa 2006). When we denote survival time by T and the time of exit by T = t, the discrete hazard for the proportional odds model is given by
Similarly, the discrete time hazard for the proportional hazard model (as proposed by Cox 1972) is given by
As shown in Thompson (1977) , the two models become very similar when the grouping intervals (the difference between discrete points in time) become short. In both formulations, the elements of the γ vector approximate the partial elasticities of the likelihood to exit the gold standard with respect to the vector of variables X t .
In the empirical analysis I will explore how the various factors suggested in the literature affect the probability to exit from the gold-exchange standard under different assumptions on the form of both, the baseline hazard and the link function.
The estimated models are then evaluated based on the conventional indicators Following Klein and Marion (1997) and others, the dependent variable equals zero in any month when the country adheres to the gold standard and equals one in the month that the spell ends. After the spell has ended, the country drops out of the sample. I
will define "exit" as either the imposition of exchange controls or devaluation (whatever occurred earlier). The explanatory variables are always introduced with a one-month time lag, and I will now describe, how they are defined.
To start with, the simple idea that the probability to exit should depend on how badly the economy was hit by deflationary shocks I collected monthly data on wholesale prices (whole28) indexed to 1928 = 100. Note that the use of index data eliminates the cross-sectional variation in levels of prices as of 1928, due to data limitations. Price deflation in turn may have raised unemployment directly via rising real wages, or indirectly via rising indebtedness of vulnerable sectors and declining industrial production. To test for these effects I collected monthly data on industrial production (ind28, indexed to 1928 = 100) and on rates of unemployment that refer to the number of registered unemployed over the total economically active population in order to ensure comparability between countries. I will use both, unadjusted rates of unemployment (unrate) and rates adjusted for seasonal fluctuations by the X12 seasonal adjustment method (unrate_x12). Note that an increase in unemployment and a decline in industrial output should be largely endogenous to changes in price deflation (Newell an Symons 1988), so we would not expect them to matter simultaneously.
Next, I collected monthly data on bank deposits, again indexed to 1928 = 100, to capture the occurrence of a banking crisis (banking). Details on the data are given in the appendix. Such an index of bank deposits should reflect any banking crisis that was large enough to threaten the currency of a country. However, this is arguably a rough proxy -ignoring for example any "structural" weaknesses of a country's banking sector. As argued in Temin (2008) , and in a modified version also in Grossman (1994) , adherence to the gold standard tended to increase the vulnerability of European banks. If so, the longer a given country stayed on gold, the higher ceteris paribus the probability that a banking crisis occurs. These ideas can be tested in a The argument that various factors "conditioned" the development of macroeconomic fundamentals is captured by several variables. First, I control for the parity at which a country resumed the gold standard in the 1920s as a percentage of its pre-war parity (devalhist), varying from values close to 0 to 100. Note that this can also be interpreted as reflecting differences in perceived "credibility" or a "fear of floating". For example, a significantly positive coefficient on this variable would indicate that countries, which returned to gold at parity much below the pre-war parity, were ceteris paribus less prone to exit gold. This could support the idea that they simply weathered the crisis more easily or that they were eager to stick to the gold-standard in fear that an exit would undermine their credibility. However, we can try to distinguish these two arguments by interacting the effect of devaluation with the status of a debtor, because a "fear of floating"-type argument should apply only to net-capital importers. Next, I will control for the (gold value) of monthly net-exports to capture the idea that conditions in international trade affected a country's ability to adhere to gold. The argument that Germany faced a regime change in terms of access to international capital markets after first announcements of the Young-Plan is captured by a dummy Young29, which is one for Germany from March 1929 onwards and zero else. While again, this is a somewhat simplistic approach, it should help to capture the fundamental change in Germany's access to international capital by allowing for a change in Germany's baseline hazard from March 1929 onwards.
Finally, I also include the monthly (gold-) value of a country's net-exports (netex).
The commitment to defend the gold standard in month t+1 should be all the more credible, the higher a country's reserves in gold and foreign exchange in month t. relative to the amount of circulating coins and notes. Hence, I include the "cover ratio" defined as the ratio of gold and reserves relative to M 0 as a regressor. 
IV. Results and Interpretation
In all the following estimations, the dependent variable equals "zero" in any month when the country adheres to the gold standard and equals "one" in the month that the spell ends. After the spell has ended, the country drops out of the sample (see Klein and Marion 1997) . Here, exit is defined as either the imposition of exchange controls or devaluation (whatever occurred earlier). The explanatory variables are always introduced with a one-month time lag. estimate a logit-model (equivalent to a proportional odds model), where I assume that the baseline hazard rate is constant and common for all countries (column 1). Next, I
repeat this for a "log-log" or extreme value specification (equivalent to a proportional hazards model in discrete time). The overall fit of the two models is good and quite similar, with a McFadden R2 of 0.56 and 0.60 respectively. It is useful to recall that the estimated coefficients under the logistic and the log-log link-functions need to be standardised before comparison, as the underlying distributions have a different variance: π/3 and π/6
respectively. Hence, the coefficients estimated under the logit-model should be divided by two to be comparable to the coefficients estimated under the log-logmodel. After this, it becomes apparent that the coefficients are similar under the two models. Note also that the estimated coefficients do not directly reflect the marginal effects on the dependent variable, but they do reflect the sign of the marginal effect and whether the effect is significant or not. Not surprisingly, according to both models there is a positive baseline hazard to exit gold at any time between January 1928 and December 1936. Moreover, both specifications agree on the signs of the coefficients.
As expected, the higher the level of wholesale prices relative to 1928, the lower the probability that a country leaves gold. Also, neither the rate of industrial production, nor the rate of unemployment have a significant impact on exit after controlling for deflation just because the former are to a large degree driven by the latter (Newell an Symons 1988, Bernanke and James 1991). It is interesting to see that the level of bank deposits (banking) still helps to predict the exit from gold after many other controls.
This seems to support the claim of James (1984) and Schnabel (2004) that the financial sector mattered for the currency crisis in addition to other factors. However,
we will have to test, whether this still holds after controlling for the time a country has spent on gold.
There is also some evidence that various "conditioning" factors mattered that affected macroeconomic fundamentals in different countries. Debtor countries were somewhat more prone to exit gold than creditors, but the effect is not significant.
However, countries, which had returned on gold only after a significant devaluation in the 1920s were -ceteris paribus -more prone to stay on the gold-exchange standard.
As argued above, this might support both, the idea that they simply weathered the crisis more easily (which would fit the case of France) or that they were eager to stick to the gold-standard in fear that an exit would undermine their credibility (which might help to understand the case of Poland). Other results of Table 1 are more clear-cut. Among the other factors that condition the hazard rate over time, the cover ratio, central bank independence, the political regime, and the pattern of trade integration seem to matter empirically. We introduced the cover ratio to capture the credibility of further adherence to gold and not surprisingly we find that the higher the cover ratio, the lower probability to exit.
The positive and significant coefficient on indep suggests that Central Bank independence helped to release the Golden Fetters, ceteris paribus. This can be interpreted along a second generation model, where the loss in credibility associated with the "broken promise" of exit from gold is limited due to a public belief in the Central Bank's commitment to limit inflation. Related to this, the positive and always significant coefficient on the polity variable suggests that institutionalised democracies indeed tended to leave the gold-exchange standard earlier, as has been argued by Simmons (1994) , Eichengreen and Simmons (1995) and James (2001) .
Finally, these first estimations show that some specific aspects of the European trade pattern mattered for monetary policy. Ceteris paribus, countries followed their main trading partner either to stay on gold or to exit: recall that we defined the variable tradegold as 1 whenever a country's main trading partner was on gold, and 0 else.
However, intriguingly, in addition to this there is strong evidence that the degree of In a next step, I relax the assumption that duration dependence is constant over time and more generally, that the effect of the conditioning factors is constant over time. To explore the time structure more closely, I must save on degrees of freedom and will consider only those coefficients that were significant at a 10% level in at least one specification of Table 1 . Note, that this elimination of insignificant regressors has only minor effects on the coefficients of the remaining variables. In Table 2 , columns 1 (model 3) and 2 (model 4), I re-estimate the logit-and the extreme-value-models with the assumption that the baseline hazard for each country varies with the time that has elapsed after the country resumed the gold standard in the 1920s (in months). Generally, there is strong evidence for positive duration dependence: the longer a country stayed on gold, the higher the probability to exit. As argued above, there is actually an interpretation for this effect along the lines of Temin (2008) . Note however, that nearly all other conditioning factors remain highly significant with the same signs as in Table 1 . Especially, the banking crisis indicator continues to matter:
if indeed adherence to the gold standard tended to increase the vulnerability of European banks as argued in Temin (2008) and Grossman (1994) , there is some evidence that other "structural" factors mattered as well, as suggested in third generation models. It is the very point of Schnabel's (2004) argument that a currency and a banking crisis occurred at the same time, but for possibly different reasons.
But why exactly did adherence to the gold-exchange standard contribute to currency crises and possibly "twin crises" in the 1930s? The key mechanism suggested in Eichengreen (1992) is that tightening monetary conditions in the main capital exporting countries spilled over into capital importing countries in their attempt to prevent capital outflows. The implied deflation put these countries between "Scylla and Charybdis" as real wages and real interest rates increased to unseen levels: in an attempt to rescue the currency, they wrecked the economy. As argued earlier, this mechanism could have triggered "twin crises" in debtor countries as observed for example in Germany, Austria or Hungary. We can easily test for this idea by estimating both, duration dependence and the banking crisis indicator separately for creditor and debtor countries. As shown in Table 2 , columns 3 (model 5) and 4 (model 6), the data support exactly this: it was the debtor countries that suffered the more the longer they stayed on gold. And it is only in these countries that in addition to other factors a banking crisis helps to predict the occurrence of a currency crisis.
The other rather specific assumption that I made in all estimations so far is that coefficients are stable over time. Especially, the trade pattern that was highly persistent over the entire interwar period may have affected the pattern of monetary policy choices differently at different points in time. And this should be so, because of differences between countries. For example, if economic integration with France would pick up some factors specific for the later members of the Gold Bloc (in our sample Italy and Poland besides France), this factor should be stronger after 1931. In Table 3 , columns 1 and 2, I show that indeed this is borne out by the data: while the other coefficients are largely unchanged according to both, the Cox proportional hazard model (extreme value), and the proportional odds model (logit), the degree of trade integration with France has the same sign as before but is insignificant if we limit attention to January 1928-December 1931. We will have to explore what particular factors characterised the economic relations with France for those countries that stayed on gold after 1931. Finally, these various models apparently all help predicting the exit from gold, but which one is the most appropriate? Actually, there are two dimensions related to our basic question "Why were some more inclined than others to release their gold fetters?" (Eichengreen 1992) . First, what model is most suitable to predict the general pattern of exit from the gold-exchange standard in our sample? Second, what model is best suited to predict exit country-by-country? For example, some model might be able to predict the very month of exit for some countries, but entirely fail with respect to other countries' experience. Another model might not predict the exact month of exit for any single country in the sample, but still help to predict the overall exit pattern better than any other model. Therefore, I suggest assessing the model fit with several approaches. To assess the overall fit, I compare the different models in Tables   1 and 2 according to various standard information criteria (McFadden R2, Akaike, and Schwarz). Second, I will consider the ability of the various models to predict the exit from gold overall, and country by country.
The evidence on McFadden R 2 and the Information Criteria in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that we should take the time a country has spent on gold into account, as this does improve the overall model fit. Moreover, the proportional odds model (logit) specifications generally fit the data slightly better. Models 3 and 5 have the same
Akaike statistic, but model 5 has a higher ("worse") Schwarz statistic (because this imposes a larger penalty for additional coefficients than the Akaike criterion). On the other hand, model 5 shows the highest McFadden R-Squared. But is there any model that can predict the very month of exit for any sample country? Table 4 summarises how exactly the various models help to predict the pattern of exit, month by month. The first column of Table 4 shows how often a given model correctly predicted that a country would stay on gold (dependent variable = 0). Column 2 shows evidence on a much tougher test: how often a model correctly predicted that a country would leave gold (dependent variable = 1). Column 3 shows, how much a model improves the prediction compared to a default model that simply assumes some constant probability to exit (in terms of formula (1) this is a constant baseline hazard rate where all conditioning factors X(t) are set to zero). Reassuringly, all models do much better than the default, but only models 3 and 5 have a reasonable hit rate above 50% in predicting the very month of exit (column 2). In the next section I will briefly explore what countries are better predicted by what model, and suggest some hypotheses for the particular evidence on France and Poland.
V. Back to the details: country experiences on a comparative background
The above models could explain the pattern of exit relatively well, but we still don not know, which countries deviated from that pattern and what factors actually determined the prediction for specific countries. To start with, Table 5 contrasts the actual month of exit to the months predicted by models 1-6 for the various sample countries. Poland would be as democratic as Czechoslovakia in the Interwar Period? Table 6 shows the results for some counterfactual simulations of model 3. With the polity-score of Czechoslovakia, the model would predict a Polish exit already in July 1934, shortly after Italy. The cover ratio in July 1934 was still about 60%, but a continuing sharp price deflation put the Polish economy under pressure.
What apparently worked against this was a high degree of adherence to France, rather In this political environment of 1931 it is hardly surprising that Poland followed neither Germany (still her largest trading partner) nor later Britain off gold.
In addition to a possible risk of inflation, the Polish government feared to lose access to French capital when it felt to need it most. Polish monetary policy apparently hinged to a large degree on the strategic considerations of the authoritarian regime. find that a key factor was the extent of deflationary pressure that each country faced, which might have triggered both rising unemployment and "debt deflation". However, many factors conditioned its impact. There is evidence that the experience of a banking crisis was an independent additional factor in debtor countries, in line with third-generation models of currency crises. Moreover, the ability to defend further adherence to gold -as reflected in the cover ratio -affected the exit decisions. And 
